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Setting Things Straight: Adding a
Provision to Allow Damages for Emotional
Distress in the Bankruptcy Code Could
Clear up a Lot of Confusion
I. INTRODUCTION
Every year, Americans who file for bankruptcy' receive protection from
the automatic stay, a statutory device designed to stop creditors' collection
efforts while the debtor puts his financial affairs in order. 2 Despite the
existence of the stay and the fact that it is automatically triggered upon a
debtor's filing for bankruptcy, courts are replete with cases in which overly
aggressive creditors use questionable and reprehensible means to obtain
payment from delinquent debtors.3 As a result of creditors' actions in

1. Bruce M. Price & Terry Dalton, From Downhill to Slalom: An Empirical
Analysis of the Effectiveness of BAPCPA (and Some Unintended Consequences), 26
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 135, 142 (2007) (noting that in 2005 alone, approximately two
million consumer bankruptcies were filed, with more than 1.5 million as Chapter 7
cases, but the number of cases filed has dropped in the last two years (2006-2007)
below the million mark).
2. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 394 nn.3-4 (8th Cir. 1986) (construing the United
States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)) ("The automatic stay is one of the
fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a
breathing spell from his [or her] creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all
harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment
or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove
him into bankruptcy. The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without
it, certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's
property. Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to
and to the detriment of other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly
liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated equally. A race of
diligence by creditors for the debtor's assets prevents that."), rev'd on other grounds,
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
3. See, e.g., In re Carrigan, 109 B.R. 167, 168-72 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1989) (the
court determined the debtor's actions, including visiting the debtor's house after 9
p.m. on a Sunday evening, demanding immediate repayment of the debt, swearing,
and using obscene gestures conclusively constituted a violation of the automatic stay,
warranting actual and punitive damages, as well as a discharge of the creditor's prepetition claim.); Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 291
(4th Cir. 1986) (one of the debtor's employees was injured trying to prevent
repossession of a company vehicle and one of the creditor's agents carried a firearm
during a second attempted repossession); In re Wagner, 74 B.R. 898, 900-01 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1987) (creditor unsuccessfully attempted to tow the debtor's truck in which
he lived, and one evening, creditor "burst into the debtor's home, shut the lights and,
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violation of the automatic stay, an aggrieved debtor, already suffering under
the weight of his financial difficulties, may experience some form of
emotional distress.4 Although the Bankruptcy Code permits an award of
actual and punitive damages, as well as attorneys' fees, to an injured debtor,
the Code does not explicitly address whether damages are available for
emotional distress. 5
Thus, courts are left to wrangle with the issue
themselves, often undertaking considerable analysis of the statutory text,
statutory history, and contextual clues to address the issue. 6 Not surprisingly,
this struggle often leads to divergent results between courts. With differing
standards and burdens of proof depending on the court, aggrieved debtors are
often at the mercy of the specific jurisdiction's precedent. The inconsistent
treatment of the same statutory text leaves the debtor rolling the dice - what
in one jurisdiction may amount
may be a large recovery for emotional distress
8
to little or nothing in another jurisdiction.
This Comment details the history of the automatic stay, the differing
treatment of the statute in various jurisdictions, and the potential
ramifications to debtors. Clearly, much of the time-consuming analysis
performed by courts could be avoided if the Bankruptcy Code expressly
permitted recovery for emotional distress, something most courts already
permit, albeit only after considerable hand-wringing and strained reasoning.
in the darkness, held up a finger to the debtor's head (as if he were holding a gun) and
screamed, 'I'm not playing, I'm not playing, next time I'm going to blow your brains
out, bring a gun and I'll blow your brains out."'); In re Mercer, 48 B.R. 562, 564
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (creditor's employees went to the debtor's house, kicked and
pounded on debtor's door for ten minutes, and debtor's scared children allowed
employees to enter house to repossess collateral).
4. See, e.g., In re Flynn, 185 B.R. 89, 93 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (Nangle, J.) (court
determined debtor suffered emotional distress (anxiety), despite presenting no
medical evidence, when her checking account was frozen for seven days, she was
forced to cancel son's birthday party, and she was embarrassed when her check for
groceries was refused); In re Brigham, No. 01-10831-MWV, 2001 WL 1868123, at
*2 (Bankr. D.N.H. Dec. 17, 2001) (finding emotional distress when, despite receiving
notice of the debtor's bankruptcy filing, a hospital continued to send letters and
contact debtor, which caused her to suffer difficulty in breathing and increased stress);
In re Covington, 256 B.R. 463, 467 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2000) (holding damages for
emotional distress were appropriate when debtor received notice of IRS intent to levy
and experienced anguish); In re Poole, 242 B.R. 104, 112 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1999)
(finding emotional distress for violation of a discharge injunction when debtor was
stigmatized at work and wrongful post discharge garnishment caused humiliation and
shock); In re Fisher, 144 B.R. 237, 239-40 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992) (damages appropriate
for "embarrassment and emotional distress" when creditor accused debtor of criminal
conduct if she did not allow him to repossess vehicle and attempted to repossess
vehicle again during § 341 meeting).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2006).
6. See, e.g., In re Dawson, 390 F.3d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 2004).
7. See discussion infra Parts III.A, IV.
8. See discussion infra Parts IlI.A, IV.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/9
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As a result, this Comment proposes a statutory addition to § 362(k) that
addresses the dual concerns of bankruptcy courts: (1) allowing a legitimately
injured debtor to recover for emotional distress damages while (2) providing
a standard and burden of proof narrow enough to prevent frivolous claims.
The proposed addition is also broad enough to allow courts discretion to
consider the type of harm alleged and the credibility of the source, while
requiring "severe emotional distress" - a requirement designed to curb or
eliminate frivolous claims. 9 Finally, it is also argued that as a policy matter
an addition is necessary not only to meet the primary underlying objectives of
the automatic stay but also to provide consistent
treatment for all debtors and
0
creditors regardless of the jurisdiction.'

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Under the federal bankruptcy system, when a debtor files a bankruptcy
petition, a bankruptcy estate is automatically created consisting of "all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case." 1 The filing of the petition also triggers an automatic stay pursuant to
§ 362, which is considered to be "among the most basic of debtor protections
under bankruptcy law."' 12 The automatic stay springs into effect immediately
upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, regardless of whether the parties to
the proceeding are aware that a petition has been filed 13 and it operates
without the necessity of judicial intervention. 14 Correspondingly, because the
stay is automatic, it cannot be waived and relief from it "'can be granted
only
5
by the bankruptcy court having jurisdiction over a debtor's case."
9. See discussion infra Part IV.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006).
12. In re Soares, 107 F.3d 969, 975 (1st Cir. 1997). Additionally, an
enlightening portion of a House Report states,
[t]he automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided
by bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors.
It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions....
The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it, certain
creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's
property .

.

. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation

procedure under which all creditors are treated equally.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 629697.

13. In re Vierkant, 240 B.R. 317, 320 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999).
14. Soares, 107 F.3d at 975 ("The stay springs into being immediately upon the
filing of a bankruptcy petition: '[b]ecause the automatic stay is exactly what the name
implies - 'automatic' - it operates without the necessity for judicial intervention."'
(quoting Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d 106, 113 (1st Cir. 1997))).
15. Id. at 320-21 (quoting Constitution Bank v. Tubbs, 68 F.3d 685, 691 (3d Cir.
1995)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 74, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 9
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

Generally, the stay prohibits:
"the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other
action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been
commenced before the commencement of the case under this title,
or to recover a claim against
the debtor that arose before the
' 6
commencement of the case."'
The automatic stay also operates to prohibit "any act to collect, assess,
or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of
the case"' 17 and it protects the debtor's assets while giving the debtor
breathing room to reorganize.' 8 Unless relief from the stay is granted, the
stay "'continues until the bankruptcy case is dismissed or closed, or discharge
is granted or denied." ' 19
Despite the application of the automatic stay, numerous cases detail
creditors' sometimes desperate and nefarious efforts to collect from debtors,
including leaving harassing phone messages, 20 telling the debtor she will be
committing a "criminal felony" if she fails to surrender her vehicle, 21 sending
threatening letters req~uesting the debtor to reaffirm the debt or she will be
charged with fraud, initiating proceedings to foreclose on the debtor's
property, 23 freezing the debtor's bank account for seven days, 24 going to the
debtor's house and using abusive language, refusing to leave, and making
obscene gestures, 25 carrying a firearm during repossession, 26 entering the
debtor's house, turning off the lights, pointing finger at debtor's head (to

16. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006). Note that § 362(a)(2) through (a)(8) impose
additional limitations, which are not detailed here.
17. Id. § 362(a)(6). One court examining this provision noted that it stops "'all
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions .... [and] permits the

debtor... to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy."'
Vierkant, 240 B.R. at 320 (quoting In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 394 n.3 (8th Cir.
1986)).
18. In re Kmart Corp., 285 B.R. 679, 688 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002). One court
noted in slightly different phrasing, it "protect[s] debtors from all collection efforts
while they attempt to regain their financial footing." In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569,
571 (9th Cir. 1992).
19. Vierkant, 240 B.R. at 321 (quoting ConstitutionBank, 68 F.3d at 691-92).
20. In re Jackson, 309 B.R. 33, 39 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004).
21. In re Fisher, 144 B.R. 237, 238 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992).
22. Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 878 (7th Cir. 2001).
23. Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 1999).
24. United States v. Flynn (In re Flynn), 185 B.R. 89, 93 (S.D. Ga. 1995)
(Nangle, J.).
25. In re Carrigan, 109 B.R. 167, 168-72 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1989).
26. Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1986).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/9
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resemble a gun) and screaming at the debtor,27 and kicking in the debtor's
28
door, thereby scaring the debtor's children. However, not all violations of
the automatic stay involve egregious or outrageous creditor conduct. In fact,
violations occur for much more mundane reasons like "technical" violations,
such as "a demand or collection letters, account statements, notices of intent
to levy or collection letters issued by the IRS, mortgage acceleration letters
and similar communications" 29 which are "unaccompanied by any financial
loss or property deprivation." 30 To avoid potential liability, one court
suggested that:
a creditor advised that a bankruptcy has been filed or is being filed
should continue the conversation only long enough to obtain
information to verify the bankruptcy, i.e., the creditor should ask
for the case number and the district and division in which the case
is pending. If this information is unavailable, the creditor should
ask for the name of the debtor's attorney and then promptly hang
up. Questions regarding the
3 1 debtor's intentions with respect to
collateral are inappropriate.
If a creditor violates the automatic stay, the 1984 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code give an individual debtor a cause of action in bankruptcy
against such creditor under § 362(k).32 This code section provides in part that
"an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this
section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and,
in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages. 33 Thus, a
party seeking damages for a stay violation must establish that: (1) a violation
occurred; (2) the violation was committed willfully; (3) the violation caused
actual damages; and if punitive damages are sought, (4) that the
circumstances are such that punitive damages should be awarded.34
Generally, courts find a violation to be "willful" if a creditor had
knowledge of the bankruptcy filing and deliberately acted in such a way that

27. In re Wagner, 74 B.R. 898 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
28. In re Mercer, 48 B.R. 562 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
29. Walter Thurmond & Jeff Fleming, Do Section 362(h) "Actual Damages"
Include Emotional Distress Damages?, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Sept. 2004, at
14.
30. Id.
31. In re Skeen, 248 B.R. 312, 318 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2006). The original section was § 362(h), but that has
since been amended to § 362(k). See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 305, 119 Stat. 23, 79.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).
34. In re Bright, 334 B.R. 19 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005), af'd, 338 B.R. 530
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
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violated the stay. 35 The willfulness element does not require that the creditor
have a specific intent to violate the automatic stay; rather, a willful violation
occurs when the creditor knew of the automatic stay and intentionally acted in
violation of the stay.36 In cases where the creditor receives actual notice of
the stay, courts presume the violation was deliberate. 37 Furthermore, it is
typically the debtor's responsibility to provide the creditor with actual notice
of the filing. Once the debtor proves that he provided notice to the creditor
of the bankruptcy petition, the burden shifts to the creditor to prove that its
actions were not violations of the automatic stay. 39 However, even an
innocent stay violation in which the creditor does not have knowledge of the
stay becomes willful if the violator fails to remedy the violation after
receiving notice of the stay.40 While "the Bankruptcy Code does not require a
debtor to warn his creditors of existing violations [of the automatic stay or
other such protective provisions] prior to moving for sanctions, ' 4l the debtor
must "exercise due diligence in protecting and pursuing
his rights ' '42 and in
• • 43
mitigating his damages with regard to such violations.
If a debtor can successfully prove a willful violation of the automatic
stay," an award of actual damages, including costs and attorney's fees
incurred by the debtor to remedy the stay violation, is mandatory.4 5 Courts
have held that § 362(k)'s "shall recover" language indicates Congressional
intent to require a mandatory award of actual damages without judicial
discretion in the matter. 4 6 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court may not award

35. In re Preston, 333 B.R. 346 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2005).
36. Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp, 337
F.3d 314, 320 n.8 (3d Cir. 2003).
37. Homer Nat'l Bank v. Namie, 96 B.R. 652, 654 (W.D. La. 1989). However,
note that courts have held that without notice of the bankruptcy filing and therefore,
without notice of the automatic stay, a creditor may not be deemed to have willfully
violated the automatic stay.
38. In re Smith, 180 B.R. 311, 319 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995).
39. Id.
40. In re Campion, 294 B.R. 313, 317 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003).
41. In re Oksentowicz, 324 B.R. 628, 630 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2005).
42. Id; see also In re Barr, 318 B.R. 592, 604 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004).
43. E.g., In re Rosa, 313 B.R. 1, 9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004); Barr, 318 B.R. at
604.
44. In re Bivens, 324 B.R. 39, 42 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004). In this case, the
court noted that .'willful,' unlike many other contexts, does not require any specific
intent. Rather, for purposes of § 362(h), 'willful' has simply been interpreted to mean
any intentional and deliberate act undertaken with knowledge - whether obtained
through formal notice or otherwise - of the pending bankruptcy." Id. (citation
omitted).
45. Id.; In re Hawk, 314 B.R. 312, 317 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2004).
46. E.g., In re Ramirez, 183 B.R. 583, 589 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995), appeal
dismissed, 201 F.3d 444 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Int'l Forex of Cal., Inc., 247 B.R. 284,
291 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2000).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/9
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actual damages
in an amount greater than that which is supported by either
"ccredible' A7 or "concrete" evidence shown with "reasonable certainty. ' 48
Because of the recent increase in bankruptcy filings, courts are more
frequently confronted with the issue of the damages available to debtors
affected by violations of the automatic stay. This increase has also forced
courts to confront the issue of whether damages should be available for
emotional distress claims and, if so, what amount is appropriate.

III.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A. Actual Damages
One of the most oft-cited cases addressing the issue of the availability of
damages for emotional distress is the Seventh Circuit's decision of Aiello v.
ProvidianFinancialCorp.49 In this case, a debtor attempted to recover under
the "actual damages" provision of § 362(h) 50 after the creditor sent the debtor
letters "ask[ing] her to reaffirm the debt and threatened to charge her with
fraud if she refused., 51 The debtor ultimately refused to reaffirm the debt,
and after receiving the creditor's threatening letters she "cried, felt nauseous
and scared and the letter caused her to quarrel with her husband ....

Even

after her meeting with her attorney, [the debtor] was still frightened.5 52 The
court was confronted with the issue of whether a debtor can recover for
emotional distress in the absence of any financial distress. In rejecting the
claim and affirming the lower court's dismissal, the Seventh Circuit noted
that, "[t]he office of section 362(h) is not to redress tort violations but to

47. For example, that the debtor's business reputation has been injured by the
stay violation. See Archer v. Macomb County Bank, 853 F.2d 497, 500 (6th Cir.
1988) (holding that the bankruptcy court had improperly awarded actual damages "in
an amount greater than that which was supported by credible evidence" of injury to a
debtor's business reputation).
48. E.g., In re Heghmann, 316 B.R. 395, 405 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004); In re Baird,
319 B.R. 686, 690 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2004); In re Gagliardi, 290 B.R. 808, 819
(Bankr. D. Colo. 2003); In re Lyckberg, 310 B.R. 881, 891 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
2004); In
re All Trac Transp., Inc., 306 B.R. 859, 898 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004).
49. 239 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2001).
50. Section 362(h) was renumbered to § 362(k)(1) after the 2005 BAPCPA
Amendments. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of

2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 305, 119 Stat. 23, 79. Both sections contain identical
language. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2000) ("[A]n individual injured by any
willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages,
including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover

punitive damages."), with 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006) (same). Newer cases and this
article will refer to § 362(k)(1).
51. Aiello, 239 F.3d at 878.
52. Id.(omission in original).
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protect the rights conferred by the automatic stay.",53 The court also noted
that the law has always been wary of such claims "because they are so easy to
manufacture." 54 Finally, the court concluded that because the automatic stay
protection is financial in character and the debtor had suffered no actual
financial damage, her injury looked more like a tort injury, for which she
could pursue the normal state-law tort remedies against oppressive debtcollection tactics. Despite the denial of her suit, the court left the door open
for debtors to "piggyback" a claim for damages from emotional distress to a
claim for financial loss under § 362(h), avoiding the need to bring two
separate suits. 56 Thus, under the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, an emotional
distress claim is available albeit only in a limited set of circumstances.
The recent case of In re Dawson rejected the approach adopted in Aiello
and Bermitted damages for emotional distress without requiring financial
loss. In this case, the debtors filed an adversary complaint against a bank to
recover for willful violations of the automatic stay that allegedly occurred
during the debtors' previous Chapter 7 proceeding. The evidence showed
that the bank instituted a foreclosure sale, served notice upon the debtor to
quit the premises, and instituted an unlawful detainer action against the debtor
while the automatic stay was in place. 59 The bankruptcy court held that the
foreclosure sale did not violate the automatic stay but found that the unlawful
detainer action did constitute a violation. 60 However, the court determined
that the violation was not egregious or corroborated by evidence of emotional
distress that warranted an award of damages. 61 On appeal, the district court
affirmed on the damages issue, remanded the case to the bankruptcy court,
and the debtor appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In considering the issue on appeal, the Ninth Circuit started with
statutory interpretation of § 362(k) of the Bankruptcy Code.62 Much like
other courts that have confronted the issue, the Ninth Circuit was unsure if the
term "actual damages" included damages for emotional distress. 63 In
deciding the issue, the court was persuaded by a contextual clue in that
Congress limited actual damages to "an individual injured by any willful
53. Id. at 880.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 879-81.
56. Id. at 880. The court also justified this result based on the interests of
judicial economy and the "clean-up" doctrine of equity. Id.
57. 390 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2004).
58. Id. at 1144.
59. Id.

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1146. Section 362(k) was the precursor to § 362(h) before the 2005
BAPCPA Amendments and contained identical language. See Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 305, 119 Stat.
23, 79.
63. Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1146.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/9
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violation..."64 Because Congress limited damages to individuals, the court
noted that "Congress signaled its special interest in redressing harms that are
unique to human beings. One such harm is emotional distress, which can be
suffered by individuals but not by organizations." 65 Despite this contextual
support, the court still noted that the term "remains
66 ambiguous," and so it
turned to the legislative history for further guidance.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit noted that the automatic stay was
enacted with a "two-fold purpose" aimed at allowing the debtor to "achieve
financial goals andnon-financial goals," such as obtaining a "breathing spell"
from creditors, which suggested a "human side to the bankruptcy process. 67
With further analysis of the statutory text, the court noted that "we are
convinced that Congress was concerned not only with financial loss, but also
- at least in part - with the emotional and psychological toll that a violation
of a stay can exact from an individual. 68 As a result, the court concluded
that an injured debtor could bring a claim for emotional damages for a willful
violation of the automatic stay, but only if there was clear evidence
establishing the alleged harm. 69 Further, the court noted 70that "not every
willful violation merits compensation for emotional distress."
The In re Dawson court thus established a standard that both allowed
claims for emotional distress while at the same time limiting frivolous
lawsuits. The court's three part standard required that "an individual must (1)
suffer significant harm, (2) clearly establish the significant harm, and (3)
demonstrate a causal connection between that significant harm and the
violation of the automatic stay (as distinct, for instance, from the anxiety and
pressures inherent in the bankruptcy process). 7 1 To further clarify the
standard, the court noted that "fleeting or trivial anxiety or distress does not
suffice to support an award; instead, an individual must suffer significant
emotional harm., 72 Additionally, the emotional harm must be established by
clear and convincing evidence, such as through corroborating medical
evidence or rthrough testimony
from non-experts such as family members,
73
friends, or coworkers. However, the court also noted that in some cases
corroborating evidence may not be required to prove emotional distress. In
particular, in situations where the emotional distress was readily apparent or
in circumstances which make it obvious that a reasonable person would suffer

64. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)).

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1147.

68. Id. at 1148.
69. Id. at 1149.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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significant emotional harm, even if the violation was not egregious. 74 Based
on the newly enunciated the standard,
75 the court remanded the case to the
bankruptcy court for reconsideration.
The First Circuit followed a similar approach to that of the Ninth Circuit
in the case of Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb.76 In that case, the debtor
was an eighty-five-year-old widower who maintained a residence in
Massachusetts during the summer months and a residence in Florida during
To satisfy his creditors, the debtor sold his
the winter months.
Massachusetts home and then filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.78 While the
bankruptcy proceedings were underway, the creditor filed a foreclosure suit
in Florida state court to foreclose on the debtor's Florida house. 79 The
debtor's attorney informed the creditor of the stay, but the creditor's attorneys
failed to dismiss the foreclosure suit for another six weeks.80 As a result of
the foreclosure notice being posted in the local newspaper, the debtor began
receiving a barrage of mail offering legal and investment services. 8 1 His
neighbors also learned of the foreclosure suit and began avoiding him and
stopped inviting him to social outings. 82 The debtor brought suit against the
creditor for a violation of the automatic stay and made a claim for damages
for emotional distress on the basis of not being able to sleep well, changed
eating habits, a sharp decline in social invitations, and a concern about where
to live. 83 With limited analysis, the court noted that because emotional
distress damages qualify as "actual damages" under § 362 and because the
debtor had provided specific information and not simply generalized
assertions about the decline in his emotional state, the debtor had laid a
sufficient basis of psychological suffering upon which the court could award

74. Id. at 1150.
75. Id. at 1151. In applying the enunciated standard to the facts of the debtor's
case, the court was careful to note that the debtor-husband claimed he had suffered
emotional distress, while his wife also claimed that she suffered emotional distress.
Id. at 1150. However, her testimony did not relate to her husband's alleged distress
and thus, was not corroborating evidence. Id. Despite this conclusion and the
recognition that the bankruptcy court had not erred in concluding that there was no
corroborating evidence or that the bank's stay violation was not egregious, the case
was ultimately remanded for reconsideration because the bankruptcy court had
previously (and now incorrectly) applied the standard from Aiello. Id. at 1150-51.
76. 196 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 1999).
77. Id. at 266.
78. Id. at 266-67.

79. Id. at 267.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 269-70.
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damages for emotional distress. 84 As a result, the court upheld the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's award of $25,000 for mental anguish. 5
A similar result was reached by the Fourth Circuit in the case of Green
Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clark.86 In that case, the debtor filed for Chapter 13
bankruptcy and notice was sent to the creditor. 87 During the bankruptcy
proceedings, the creditor sent an agent to the house who subsequently forced
his way into the debtor's mobile home while she was away, placed a "for
sale" sign in the window, and left a note outside the front door notifying the
debtor that she was obligated to vacate the premises. 88 Upon returning to her
residence and seeing the sign, the note, and signs of forced entry, the debtor
suffered from a psychogenic seizure. 89 After the debtor filed suit against the
creditor, "[t]he bankruptcy court awarded damages for the time and effort that
[debtor] spent defending her rights in court and for her actual damages of
being placed in genuine fear and suffering emotional injury as a result of the
violations of the automatic stay." 90 On appeal, the district court noted that
"[w]hile claims for fleeting or trivial emotional distress are not compensable,
an individual who suffers significant harm and demonstrates a causal
connection between the harm and the violation of the automatic stay is
entitled to be compensated. ' 9 1 The court further noted that, even though an
award for emotional distress cannot "be measured with precision," the debtor
in this case had presented sufficient psychological evidence that she 92
suffered
genuine fear and real emotional injury, and an award was appropriate.
The case of In re Jackson also illustrates the Eighth Circuit's approach
to the issue of emotional distress damages. 93 In that case, a husband and wife
purchased a recliner chair from a retail store on credit. 94 However, a few
months after the bankruptcy filing, the husband fell ill and died.95 The retail
84. Id. at 270. Notably, the court did not award these damages as punitive
damages and instead considered them "actual damages." Id.
85. Id. at 269-70.
86. 369 B.R. 282 (S.D. W. Va. 2007).
87. Id. at 284.
88. Id. at 284-85.
89. Id. at 285. The debtor had a pre-existing condition that made her prone to
psychogenic seizures, which according to eMedicine, is a condition that resembles
epileptic seizures, but is psychological in origin. In this case, the court determined
that the condition was triggered by the stress relating to the creditor's actions. Id.
90. Id. at 288.
91. Id. (citing In re Dawson, 390 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2004); Aiello v.
Providian Financial Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2001); Fleet Mortgage Group,
Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265, 270 (1st Cir. 1999)).
92. Id. at 288-89. The district court also affirmed the bankruptcy court's award
of $5,000. Id. at 289.
93. 309 B.R. 33, 35 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004).
94. Id. There is a more detailed factual background than what is presented in this
note. See id. at 35-37.
95. Id. at 36.
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store received notice of the bankruptcy filing but nevertheless made
numerous harassing phone calls to the widow and her granddaughter, left
several notes on her door in an attempt to repossess the chair, and even sent a
truck to the house to repossess the chair, all of which caused the widow
embarrassment. 96 In determining whether damages were available for
emotional distress, the court cited prior precedent 97 and noted that "[mlsedical
The
or other expert evidence is not required to prove emotional distress."
court stated that a plaintiffs own testimony, along with the circumstances of
a particular case, can sustain the plaintiffs burden. 99 However, the Jackson
court was not persuaded by the debtor's testimony of embarrassment in
assessing damages for emotional distress and noted that "[debtor] suffered no
physical injury, she was not medically treated for any psychological or
emotional injury, and no other witness corroborated any outward
manifestation of emotional distress."' 0 0
"While these actions were
undoubtedly annoying and embarrassing," the court stated that the debtor
could have stopped the harassment by simply asking her attorney to speak
with the creditor.' 0021 As a result, the court awarded $1.00 to the debtor in
nominal damages. 1
The bankruptcy courts in the Eighth Circuit have also rejected claims by
debtors that attempt to use a violation of the automatic stay as an obvious
ploy to receive large awards from creditors. For example, in Rosengren v.
GMAC Mortgage Corp., the debtor financed his home loan through GMAC
Mortgage Corporation ("GMAC"), but after amassing too much debt, the
debtor decided to file Chapter 7 bankruptcy in January 2000.103 The debtor
96. Id.at 36-37.
97. Specifically, the court cited Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046 (8th Cir.
1997). The Kim case involved a suit by an employee against a former employer for
wrongful discrimination. Id.at 1052. The plaintiff, his wife, and his son testified that
the plaintiff suffered "anxiety, sleeplessness, stress, depression, high blood pressure,
headaches, and humiliation," all of which the court held to be sufficient evidence of
emotional distress. Id.at 1065.
98. Jackson, 309 B.R. at 39.
99. Id.; see also, e.g., Wilmington v. J.I. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909, 922 (8th Cir.
1986) (42 U.S.C. § 1981) (witnesses corroborated plaintiff's claim of "deterioration
of his health, mental anxiety, humiliation and emotional distress"); Williams v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 660 F.2d 1267, 1272-73 (8th Cir. 1981) (medical testimony is
not necessary in order to recover damages for emotional distress); Rush v. Scott
Specialty Gases, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 194, 199 (E.D. Pa.1996) (testimony from
plaintiff's family and friends corroborating emotional distress was sufficient to
support a compensatory damage award), rev'd on other grounds, 113 F.3d 476 (3d
Cir. 1997).
100. Jackson, 309 B.R. at 39.
101. Id.
102. Id.at 41.
103. No. CIV. 00-971(DSD/JMM), 2001 WL 1149478, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 7,
2001).
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was two months behind on his home payment and intended to pay GMAC,°4
but he hoped to use the bankruptcy system to get out from two car loans.'
After filing for bankruptcy, he received a phone message from a GMAC
representative telling him to call the company.' °5 After the debtor called
GMAC and informed the representative that he had filed for bankruptcy, the
representative said she could no longer speak with him. 10 6 Nevertheless, she
also asked the debtor if he intended to reaffirm the debt, advised him to speak
10 7
with his attorney, and said someone else from GMAC would call him.
Subsequently, the debtor spoke with two other representatives from GMAC,
and both calls involved discussions
about bringing the payments current to
08
avoid any delinquency fees.'
The debtor ultimately retained his home and the bankruptcy was
discharged, but soon thereafter, he filed suit against GMAC alleging a
violation of the automatic stay and $5,000 in compensatory damages and
$25,000 in punitive damages. 0 9 Along with an itemized list of $88 in actual
damages, the debtor also alleged that he suffered embarrassment due to his
need to borrow money from his family to meet GMAC's "harassing
directives." ' 10 The court noted that because the emotional distress suffered
was "fleeting, inconsequential, and medically insignificant," the damages for
embarrassment were not compensable."' Correspondingly, the debtor's
attorneys fees were also limited and no punitive damages were awarded.' 12
B. Punitive Damages

As noted previously, some courts may decline to award emotional
distress damages for a variety of reasons. However, § 362(k) provides that a
court may award punitive damages "in appropriate circumstances."'" 3 As a
policy matter, courts have noted that the "'primary purpose of punitive
damages .. .is to cause a change in the creditor's behavior,""' 4 with an
emphasis on deterrence." 5 Additionally, this provision allows courts to
award damages to injured debtors even if debtor's claim for emotional

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4 &n.3.
Id. (citing In re Crispell, 73 B.R. 375, 380 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987)).
Id. at *6. The entire award, including attorney's fees, totaled $238. Id.

113. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006).
114. In re Quinones Ocasio, 272 B.R. 815, 825 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002) (quoting In
re Shade, 261 B.R. 213, 216 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2001)).
115. In re Dunning, 269 B.R. 357, 365 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 74, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 9
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

distress was previously rejected." 16 However, courts differ on what
constitutes "appropriate circumstances," and there is no uniform approach or
standard for this provision. Among the courts, "appropriate circumstances"
has been defined as "maliciousness or bad faith," ' l 7 "arrogant defiance of
federal law,"" l8 and "egregious, vindictive or intentional misconduct."19
Other courts employ "a multi-factor approach and considered the following
four factors: (1) the nature of the defendant's conduct; (2) the defendant's
ability to pay; (3) the motives of the defendant; and (4) any provocation by
the debtor."' 20 Still another court has established the following factors to be
evaluated: "the ratio between the compensatory and punitive damages, and
[the] difference between the punitive damage award and the civil penalties
imposed for comparable conduct."''
In the Eighth Circuit, the term "appropriate circumstances" was defined
in the case of In re Ketelsen to include "egregious, intentional
misconduct. ' 122 In Ketelsen, a farmer and his wife became significantly
indebted to a federal agency that provided them with loans. 23 After they
filed for bankruptcy, the federal, agency attempted to
124 and successfully
retained part of the couple's federal income tax return.
The bankruptcy
court awarded both actual and punitive damages for violation of the
automatic stay, but the district court reversed both awards, noting in
particular that the federal agency's conduct did not justify an award of
116. See, e.g., In re Jackson, 309 B.R. 33, 41 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004) (rejecting
the claim for emotional damages, but awarding $2,800 in punitive damages).
117. In re Taylor, 369 B.R. 282, 289 (S.D. W. Va. 2007) (citing Crysen/Montenay
Energy Co. v. Esselen Assocs., 902 F.2d 1098, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990); In re Atl. Bus. &
Cmty. Corp., 901 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Rutherford, 329 B.R. 886, 898
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005); In re Calvin, 329 B.R. 589, 604 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005); In
re Harris, 310 B.R. 395, 400 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004); In re Bivens, 324 B.R. 39, 42
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004)).
118. Id. (citing In re Curtis, 322 B.R. 470, 486 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005); In re
Bishop, 296 B.R. 890, 898 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003); In re Mullarkey, 81 B.R. 280, 284
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1987)).
119. Id. (citing Lovett v. Honeywell, 930 F.2d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1991); In re
McHenry, 179 B.R. 165, 168 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); Davis v. IRS, 136 B.R. 414,
423, n.20 (E.D. Va. 1992); In re Hampton, 319 B.R. 163, 174 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
2005); In re Cullen, 329 B.R. 52, 57-58 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2005); Jackson, 309 B.R.
at 40; In re Bivens, 324 B.R. 39, 42 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004); In re Smith, 296 B.R.
46, 56 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2003); In re Hedetneimi, 297 B.R. 837, 843 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 2003); In re Siharath, 285 B.R. 299, 305 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2002); In re Briggs,
143 B.R. 438, 464 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.1992)).
120. Id. (citing In re Heghmann, 316 B.R. 395, 405 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004)).
121. In re Quinones Ocasio, 272 B.R. 815, 825 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002) (applying
guideposts set out in BAWofN. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996)).
122. 880 F.2d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 1989).
123. Id. at 990.
124. Id.
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punitive damages.' 25 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit agreed that the violation
of the automatic stay by the creditor was certainly willful, but a violation
must also meet the "appropriate circumstances" standard in order for a court
to award punitive damages. 26 Citing cases from different circuits, the court
noted that "appropriate circumstances" must include egregious, intentional
127
misconduct on the violator's part to support a punitive damages award.
With little discussion, the court held that the federal agency's conduct did not
support an award of punitive damages for emotional distress, and it affirmed
the district court's decision.128
Similarly, in the case of In re Carpio, a divorced husband failed to pay
his portion of the mortgage. 29
The creditor instituted foreclosure
proceedings and scheduled a foreclosure sale.' 30 The debtor filed for
bankruptcy on the same day the foreclosure sale was to be held and he called
the creditor's attorney and offered him the case number of the bankruptcy
filing.' 31 Despite doing so, the creditor's attorney failed to inquire further
about the filing and continued with the foreclosure sale. 32 In addressing the
issue of whether these actions constituted "intentional, egregious
misconduct," the bankruptcy court noted that the creditor's attorney never
performed any follow-up after the foreclosure sale and deemed punitive
damages appropriate' 33"as punishment for the willful and flagrant violation of
the automatic stay."'

In the Eighth Circuit, the automatic stay also has important applicability
for a creditor who violates the stay by garnishing the debtor's wages during
the bankruptcy proceedings. For example, in the case of In re Tuecke, the
creditor obtained a judgment against the debtor and garnished a portion of the
debtor's wages.' 34 After the bankruptcy petition was filed, the creditor
continued to garnish the wages, which allegedly caused the debtor emotional
distress. 35 Although the court failed to discuss the claim for emotional
125. Id. at 993.
126. Id.
127. Id. For examples of cases finding actions sufficient to award punitive
damages, see cases cited supra note 3.
128. Ketelsen, 880 F.2d at 993. At least in this case, the court seemed persuaded
by the fact that the creditor received legal advice indicating that the offset was
justified, however erroneous the advice was. See id.In the cases cited by the court,
the conduct by the creditors was obviously egregious and involved threats to debtors,
sometimes involving weapons. See id.Perhaps the court saw these types of conduct
as materially different and did not feel the need to spell out or discuss the distinction.
129. 213 B.R. 744, 746 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.at 747.
133. Id.at 752.
134. No. 06-00399, 2006 WL 3000028, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Oct. 10, 2006).
135. Id.Specifically, in addition to the claim for emotional distress, the debtor
claimed lost funds, time off work, and attorney's fees as a result of the violation. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
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distress, the court found it appropriate to award punitive damages because of
its "blatant disregard of the rights of [the] [d]ebtor[].' 36 As all of these cases
indicate, a debtor may still be able to recover punitive damages even if he is
unable to establish sufficient evidence for emotional distress or is in a
jurisdiction in which the courts do not support a claim for emotional distress
damages. 137
IV. COMMENT
It is clear that there has been inconsistent treatment by federal courts of
§ 362(k) of the Bankruptcy Code in addressing the issue of damages for
emotional distress when a creditor violates the automatic stay. Naturally, this
could lead to the conclusion that the legislature has failed to uphold its goal of
affording the debtor a fundamental protection from collection efforts,
harassment, and foreclosure actions in bankruptcy. 13 Assuming that the
legislature intends to protect debtors from the sometimes outrageous and
egregious conduct that creditors undertake in an effort to obtain payment after
filing, § 362(k) should include a provision with a clearly delineated standard
for awarding damages for emotional distress.
Without a clear standard, the courts are left with the task of determining
whether emotional damages are available, and in some cases, rejecting a
debtor's claim for damages altogether.' 39 In other cases, courts have to
undertake an intensive and time-consuming inquiry involving statutory
136. Id. at *2.
137. See, e.g., In re Knaus, 889 F.2d 773, 775-76 (8th Cir. 1989) (affirming an
award of $750.00 in punitive damages when a creditor attempted to have the debtor
excommunicated from his church); Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc.,
804 F.2d 289, 290 (4th Cir. 1986) (awarding punitive damages of $10,000.00 when
one of the debtor's employees was injured trying to prevent repossession of a
company vehicle and one of the creditor's agents carried a firearm during a second
attempted repossession); Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp. v. Baker, 239 B.R. 484,
486, 490 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (upheld a punitive damage award of $23,000.00 after a
creditor repossessed and sold debtor's vehicle in willful violation of the automatic
stay); In re Wagner, 74 B.R. 898, 900-01, 905 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (awarding
$500.00 in punitive damages when creditor unsuccessfully attempted to tow the
debtor's truck in which he lived, and one evening, creditor "burst into the debtor's
home, shut the lights and, in the darkness, held up a finger to the debtor's head (as if
he were holding a gun) and screamed, 'I'm not playing, I'm not playing, next time
I'm going to blow your brains out, bring a gun and I'll blow your brains out."').
138. The legislative history of § 362(k) reveals the importance Congress placed
on the automatic stay as well as its fundamental objectives in enacting the section.
See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6296-97.
139. See In re Dawson, 390 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (as a matter of law,
emotional damages could not be awarded because only economic damages were
contemplated by § 362(h) (now known as § 362(k)(1))).
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interpretation, inquiry into the legislative history, and analysis of the
contextual clues' 14 of § 362(k) to determine if an award is warranted. In
addition, if the issue of damages for emotional distress is not settled in a
jurisdiction, an already distressed debtor must clear two hurdles rather than
one: the debtor must first argue that damages for emotional distress are
justified under § 362(k), and if the court agrees with the debtor, then the
debtor must provide the court with sufficient proof supporting the claim.
This additional and costly burden imposed on both the court and the debtor
does not comport with the basic objectives of the bankruptcy system. As one
court succinctly noted:
The Bankruptcy Court is a very busy place and the [c]ourt's time
and parties' monies should be spent on matters which are of
serious consequence to the parties involved. As it relates to stay
violations, such seriousness is not necessarily equated to the size of
the economic impact of a matter, but may well include emotional
trauma visited upon debtors by creditors who refuse to honor either
the automatic stay or the discharge injunction, who harass debtors
in other inappropriate ways or who demonstrate repetitive
noncompliance. This [c]ourt14 will always hear and give serious
attention to such allegations.'
The legislature's failure to create a standard also results in inconsistent
treatment for debtors in different jurisdictions. And, as illustrated by the
discussion of varying case law, what is sufficient in one jurisdiction is not
sufficient in another. While both the First Circuit in Fleet Mortgage Group,
Inc. v. Kaneb and the court in In re Faust readily awarded damages on the
basis of the debtor's worrying and being upset,142 other courts impose a
higher standard, requiring more than mere frustration, anger, fear, anxiety or
embarrassment. 143
The difference in jurisdictional approaches can be
significant for a debtor; in Kaneb, the debtor recovered $25,000 on the basis
of his testimony of not being able to sleep well, changed eating habits, a sharp
decline in social invitations, and a concern about where to live,144 while a
140. See, e.g., id.
141. In re Newell, 117 B.R. 323, 326 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
142. Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265, 269-70 (1st Cir. 1999);
In re Faust, 270 B.R. 310, 317, 320 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1998).
143. In re Bishop, 296 B.R. 890, 896 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003) (circumstances
surrounding the violation can also show that no emotional distress occurred or that it
was incompensable as merely fleeting and inconsequential); In re Stewart, No. 994171, 2000 WL 1194437, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 9, 2000) (IRS computer
generated levy notice did not inflict lasting emotional distress); In re Washington, 172
B.R. 415, 427 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994), affd in part, vacated in part, 184 B.R. 172
(S.D. Ga. 1995) (embarrassment of the debtor caused no compensable harm).
144. Kaneb, 196 F.3d at 269-70.
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debtor in In re Faust received $1,000 based on her uncorroborated testimony
that she was worried and upset for a few days.' 45 Still another court awarded
a debtor $3,000 after she quit a job due to stress, vomited and cried, and her
children were upset,' 46 while another court awarded a debtor $300 for
inconvenience and embarrassment. 47 However, other courts entirely reject
claims of embarrassment and frustration as a sufficient basis to constitute
emotional distress. 148 Of course, individual courts should have some
discretion in determining whether an award is appropriate based on the
conduct of the creditor, the condition of the debtor, and the specific facts of
the case, but such divergent awards suggest that debtors often face the luck of
the draw and should hope they are in the right jurisdiction with a sympathetic
judge and a skilled attorney.
Debtors are also faced with inconsistencies in how corroborating
evidence will be accepted by each court. Some courts find emotional distress
damages based on the testimony of the debtor alone, 149 other courts require
corroborating medical evidence, 50 while still others award damages based on
corroboration of the evidence from a relative where the facts 5and
circumstances show that the stay violation was outrageous and egregious. 1
Certainly, the blame for such inconsistencies should not be placed
squarely on the courts. Courts have the difficult task of protecting creditors
from unscrupulous debtors who may attempt to use the violation of the
automatic stay solely as a way to gain a large award from a deep-pocketed
creditor. 52 The courts also have a difficult burden in ensuring that the
debtor's harm, whether physiological, physical, or emotional, is clearly

145. Faust, 270 B.R. at 317.
146. In re Matthews, 184 B.R. 594, 601 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1995).
147. In re Davis, 201 B.R. 835, 837 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1996) (inconvenience and
some embarrassment occurred, which the court quantified at $300, 150% of the outof-pocket costs).
148. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 143.
149. See, e.g., In re Dukes, Nos. 91-15339DWS, 96-1004, 1997 WL 860676, at
*16 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 1997) (awarding $100 based on plaintiff's testimony of
devastation, headaches and high blood pressure); In re Wagner, 74 B.R. 898, 900-01
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (awarding plaintiff $100 for shock and alarm arising from
verbal assault in his home).
150. See, e.g., In re Parker, 279 B.R. 596, 604 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2000) ("The
courts have not awarded emotional distress damages when the injuries have no
medical evidence to support them. Ms. Parker has no medical evidence to support her
claim. The [c]ourt understands her obvious concern about the IRS actions, but,
without physical evidence, or an actual taking of her property, the emotional trauma is
not compensable.").
151. See, e.g., Bishop, 296 B.R. at 896-97; In re Flynn, 169 B.R. 1007, 1023
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994), affid in part, rev'd in part, 185 B.R. 89 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
152. See Rosengren v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., No. CIV. 00-971(DSD/JMM),
2001 WL 1149478, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2001).
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established and causally linked to the creditor's actions. 5 3 Although
bankruptcy obviously involves some forms of stress, embarrassment, and
frustration to the debtor, courts must distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate claims of emotional distress. With little direction from the
legislature, courts are required to create an independent standard for
accepting and rejecting these claims. Although the standards enumerated by
the courts are more similar than dissimilar, the different jurisdictional
application robs the debtor of uniform results.
Much of the confusion and difficulty courts have in identifying the right
circumstances to award emotional distress damages could be diminished with
a clearly drafted provision in § 362(k) taking into consideration the language
from several opinions. This type of provision would not only provide clear
guidance, but would also save the courts from undertaking the type of timeconsuming inquiry that often results in the same conclusion: damages for
emotional distress should be awarded under § 362(k). In consideration of the
several cases discussed herein, such a provision might look something like
the following:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), an individual injured by
any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover
actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in
appropriate circumstances, may154 recover emotional distress
damages and/or punitive damages.
(A) Emotional distress damages are available if the debtor
experiences severe emotional harm as a result of the egregious
or outrageous conduct of the creditor and the debtor's
emotional harm is corroborated by credible evidence.
Damages include, but are not limited to, an awardfor medical
expenses, lost wages, andpain and suffering.

This provision has some similarities to the language of the tort injury of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The similarities were by design
and give the provision a tort-like undertone, putting potential and present
violators alike on notice that their conduct exposes them to a risk of
significant liability. The provision should work well for courts because it not
only establishes a consistent standard from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but, at
the same time, the broad language allows courts considerable flexibility in
determining whether the creditor's actions are "egregious or outrageous." In
addition, the requirement of "severe emotional harm" also creates a bar that is
high enough to allow courts to distinguish between legitimate claims in which

153. See Bishop, 296 B.R. at 896-97.
154. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006).
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the debtor has clearly experienced emotional harm and those claims that are
frivolous or designed to exploit the creditor.
The proposed provision also allows courts to act as gatekeepers and
determine what constitutes "credible evidence." This portion of the provision
should abrogate the decisions of jurisdictions that require evidence of
emotional harm to be corroborated by medical testimony. 155 Although
corroboration by medical testimony is indeed important, a debtor's case
should not hinge on this evidentiary requirement as a precursor to
establishing liability. As several courts have already noted, the debtor's
family members or friends can serve as credible witnesses to corroborate the
debtor's emotional harm. 156 Additionally, the provision also has positive
implications for both the debtor and the courts, as injured debtors would
know that damages for emotional harm are available without performing a
detailed inquiry into the law of their jurisdiction, while courts are no longer
required to read into the "contextual clues" and legislative157history of § 362(k)
to determine if emotional distress damages are available.
Therefore, the functions of this proposed provision are threefold: (1) the
provision is arguably more pro-debtor for its express allowance of damages
for emotional distress, (2) it preserves judicial efficiency by giving the courts
express judicial power to assess damages, and (3) it serves as a clear and
specific reminder (i.e. deterrent) to creditors contemplating violating the
automatic stay.
In addition to these three purposes, the provision is also arguably more
pro-creditor than the current § 362(k). For instance, consider the case of In re
Brigham.158 In that case, a debtor suffering from chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease filed for bankruptcy and notified her creditors of the
filing. 159 Nevertheless, one of her creditors, a hospital, continued sending
At trial, the debtor claimed that she suffered
collection notice letters.'
emotional harm because every time she received a letter she became excited,
which made it harder for her to breathe. 61 The court ultimately upheld the
claim for emotional distress and awarded her damages in the amount of
$2,500.162 Although the creditor clearly violated the automatic stay, this

155. See Parker, 279 B.R. at 604 ("The courts have not awarded emotional
distress damages when the injuries have no medical evidence to support them. Ms.
Parker has no medical evidence to support her claim. The [c]ourt understands her
obvious concern about the IRS actions, but, without physical evidence, or an actual
taking of her property, the emotional trauma is not compensable.").
156. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 99.
157. See, e.g., In re Dawson, 390 F.3d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 2004).
158. In re Brigham, No. 01-10831-MWV, 2001 WL 1868123 (Bankr. D.N.H.
Dec. 17, 2001).
159. Id. at *1-2.
160. Id. at *1.
161. Id. at *2.
162. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/9
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decision seems lopsided in that the court overemphasizes the subjective
nature of the debtor. It is not impossible to imagine other bankruptcy courts,
particularly those in the Eighth Circuit, rejecting such a claim or imposing
only nominal damages.' 63 The same is true of the scenario in Kaneb, in
64
which the creditor put the debtor's foreclosure sale on hold for six weeks'
As a result, the debtor received a barrage of mail offering legal advice, which
his neighbors noticed and as a result, stopped inviting him to social events.165
Although the creditor's conduct was obviously wrong and caused the debtor
some embarrassment and loss of motivation, such conduct should simply not
be the type considered sufficient to cause emotional harm. Sending collection
notices after a bankruptcy filing should not by any stretch of the imagination
be considered "egregious" or "outrageous" conduct. Of course, it could be
argued that the creditors act at their own risk and "take their victims as they
find them," akin to the thin-skull doctrine in tort law,' 66 but such an argument
ignores the fact that these damages flow from statutory authority, not
common law. Such an approach would also lead to an explosion in
transactional costs for creditors, which could impede lending in an already
weakened economy.
From this perspective, the suggested provision would require courts to
look at both the subjective injury to the debtor and the objective conduct of
the creditor. Because the creditor's conduct must now meet the standard of
''egregious or outrageous" and debtor's emotional harm must be "severe,"
courts can no longer make accommodations for injured debtors or
overemphasize the age or illness of a debtor to justify an award. This
overemphasis on the subjective nature of the debtor results in lopsided
decisions and an inconsistent definition of what constitutes "emotional harm."
From this perspective, the suggested provision is arguably pro-creditor
because it requires a certain level of conduct be met before emotional distress
damages are available.

163. See, e.g., In re L'Heureux, 322 B.R. 407, 411 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005);
Rosengren v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., No. CIV. 00-971(DSD/JMM), 2001 WL
1149478, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2001).
164. Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265, 269 (1st Cir. 1999).
165. Id. at 267.
166. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Peiffer, 955 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Colo. 1998)
("'[T]hin skull' doctrine provides that negligent defendant is liable for harm resulting
from negligent conduct even though harm was increased by particular plaintiffs
condition at time of negligent conduct.").
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V. CONCLUSION

Although striking an appropriate balance between protecting debtors and
preventing frivolous lawsuits is a difficult task, the proposed addition to §
362(k) reaches a sensible result. At the most basic level, it requires all courts
to award emotional distress damage and provides them with express authority
to do so. From a policy standpoint, the proposed provision acts as both a
deterrent for creditors contemplating violating the automatic stay and a
punishment for those creditors that have already violated it. The enunciated
standard is also clear and precise, as damages are only awarded if a creditor's
conduct is egregious or outrageous and if the debtor has therefore suffered
severe emotional harm. The provision would strike a fairer balance than the
current court-created standards in protecting both debtors and creditors.
Without further clarification, courts will continue to be mired in confusion
about how to define an appropriate standard for awarding damages, which
only results in inconsistent treatment of the issue from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, resulting in an obvious disadvantage to debtors and creditors
alike.
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